Thursday, November 16, 2006

Course Correction - Objective: Victory

The Guardian article "US plans last big push in Iraq" reveals a new course in Iraq
President George Bush has told senior advisers that the US and its allies must make "a last big push" to win the war in Iraq and that instead of beginning a troop withdrawal next year, he may increase US forces by up to 20,000 soldiers, according to sources familiar with the administration's internal deliberations.Mr Bush's refusal to give ground, coming in the teeth of growing calls in the US and Britain for a radical rethink or a swift exit, is having a decisive impact on the policy review being conducted by the Iraq Study Group chaired by Bush family loyalist James Baker, the sources said.

Although the panel's work is not complete, its recommendations are expected to be built around a four-point "victory strategy" developed by Pentagon officials advising the group. The strategy, along with other related proposals, is being circulated in draft form and has been discussed in separate closed sessions with Mr Baker and the vice-president Dick Cheney, an Iraq war hawk.


The Guardian is correct in its conclusions but off-course in its description of the ISG role. It is doubtful that the ISG is dependent on Bush's input. Its direction can best be garnered from the expert advisors to the group. If we look at recent articles by a few of those advisors, the direction of the ISG, from the start, is clear.

  • James Jay Carafano, Ph.D.: The Dangerous Consequences of Cutting and Running in Iraq
    The premature withdrawal of American troops from Iraq would have disastrous consequences for Iraq, for the Middle East, and for American foreign policy and would lead to a full-scale humanitarian disaster. Congress should reject outright calls for America to cut and run and in­stead should insist that the Bush Administration finish the job of training Iraqi security forces that are capable of supporting the gov­ernment, dealing with sectarian violence, and providing for the safety of the civilian population.

  • Michele A. Flournoy: Five Years After 9/11 (Ch. 6)
    But if the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have taught us anything, it is that the military cannot be expected to bear the entire burden of state reconstruction. From agriculture to education to legal, health care, and governance systems, U.S. civilian agencies need more robust, effective, deployable capabilities to build capacity in weak or failing states.

  • Michael Eisenstadt: Securing Iraq: The Way Ahead
    the US effort in Iraq has, almost from the start, been hamstrung by a mismatch between means and ends, and a variety of military, economic and political constraints. The US neither has sufficient forces in-country, nor the right kind of forces.

    ...To set the conditions for a negotiated settlement, Washington must keep up the military pressure on the insurgents and convince them that military victory for them is unattainable; that the United States will stand by the Iraqi government come what may; that it will retain a potent (if somewhat diminished) military presence in Iraq for years to come in order to preclude an insurgent victory; and that such a US presence is also a major constraint on Shia revanchist violence and Iranian influence in Iraq, and is therefore in their interest.

  • Hans A. Binnendijk: Transforming for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations
    …the success of the U.S. military in transforming its forces to execute rapid decisive operations that makes it imperative to transform how it prepares for and executes stabilization and reconstruction (S&R) operations. The very rapid defeat of the enemy military means the U.S. must be ready to field the resources needed to secure stability and begin the reconstruction process promptly-even concurrently-with the end of major combat.

The references and quotes above show that the direction of the ISG has been set for several months, and is based on advice from the Expert Working Groups (not from Bush). I think we can conclude that the ISG Report will include the following recommendations:

  1. Do not leave Iraq prematurely

  2. Increase military force levels; The insurgents must be convinced of our resolve to win

  3. Increase reconstruction force levels and funds

  4. Get more NATO involvement

The ISG report will be the final step in a plan devised months ago by Bush and Baker to increase efforts in Iraq and reach out to world governments and organizations. It will be viewed as a knowledgeable source for why the increase is necessary and will provide cover for Congress, NATO, and others to participate. The first step of the plan was Rumsfeld’s resignation, which was withheld until after the elections so the report would have credibility.

Note: Reports of squabling in the ISG are probably limited to certain groups. All of the advisors listed above, and the corresponding expected recommendations from them, are from the “Military and Security Group” and I have read nothing that could be the basis for squabling among them.